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 REX S. TOH
 SOCK-YONG PHANG
 Quasi-Flag of Convenience Shipping:
 The Wave of the Future
 Many articles and books have been written to
 extol the advantages and virtues of flags of
 convenience (FOC) shipping, argue its necessi
 ty, and defend the practice. However, from the
 earliest days there has been opposition to FOC
 shipping, and lately the disenchantment over
 this questionable form of open registry has led
 to the potentially rapid growth of what can be
 termed as quasi-FOC arrangements. This article
 will first briefly trace the trend from FOCs to
 quasi-FOCs, outline the legal framework for
 regulating international shipping, then discuss
 the problems, opposition, and legal challenges
 to open registries. Finally, it will trace in detail
 the emergence and growth of quasi-FOCs,
 which is expected to be the wave of the future
 in international shipping.
 From FOC to Quasi-FOC
 Often manned by poorly trained and under
 paid crew and owned by shadowy, unscrupu
 lous characters with indeterminate nationalities,
 flags of convenience (FOC) ships have been
 pejoratively referred to as rust buckets, pirate
 flags, free booters, and runaway ships. The
 United Nations has characterized flags of con
 venience as shipping "under which there exists
 no genuine link between the State and the ships
 and, in particular, under which the State does
 not effectively exercise its jurisdiction and con
 trol in administrative, technical, and social mat
 ters over ships flying its flag."1 The Organi
 zation for Economic Cooperation and
 Development (OECD) identified the following
 as FOC countries: The Panlibhon group
 (Panama, Liberia, and Honduras), Costa Rica,
 Mr. Toh is Robert D. O'Brien professor of business,
 Seattle University, Seattle, Washington 98122, and Ms.
 Phang is lecturer, Department of Economics and
 Statistics, National University of Singapore, Republic of
 Singapore 0511.
 Lebanon, Cyprus, Malta, Somalia, Morocco,
 San Marino, Haiti, and Sierra Leone.2 The
 International Transport Workers' Federation
 added Antigua and Barbuda, Gibraltar, Sri
 Lanka, and Vanuatu to the list,3 while the
 International Trade Federation also considers
 the Cayman Islands, Seychelles, and Oman as
 flags of convenience.4
 Put off by the odium associated with flags of
 convenience, many new shipping registries
 have set themselves up as tax havens, more
 appropriately called quasi-flag of convenience
 registries,5 with strict maritime laws and the
 administrative machinery to impose and
 enforce them. The OECD added the Bahamas,
 Bermuda, and the Netherland Antilles to the
 list, while an authority on shipping included
 Hong Kong and Gibraltar as well.6 Singapore
 has converted itself from a flag of convenience
 registry to a quasi-FOC, and recently, the
 Norwegian International Shipping registry and
 the Isles of Man have been established as tax
 free captive registries for Norwegian and
 British shipping, respectively.
 The Legal Maritime Framework
 There are three bases for international mar
 itime law.7 First, ship registration conveys
 nationality to a ship and brings it within the
 regime of the national law of the country of
 registration. Article 6 of the Convention of the
 High Seas (1958) specifically states that ships
 shall sail under the flag of one country only and
 shall be subject to that flag's exclusive jurisdic
 tion.8 Second, a ship must also obey interna
 tional laws embodied in conventions that have
 been ratified by the flag state and that have
 come into force. Third, a ship may also be sub
 ject to the laws of the country in whose territor
 ial waters or port it is currently operating. But
 the "law of the flag" often has supremacy over
 the "law of the port of call." Because the coun
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 try of registry and the law of the flag affect
 ship operating economics in a major way, the
 choice of register is crucial to shipowners.
 Ship registries fall into two broad categories:
 closed and open registers. Closed registers
 restrict flagging only to nationals, in that a
 German cannot register his ships under the
 Russian flag. In contrast, open registers are
 accessible to any shipowner regardless of
 nationality. For example, the United Kingdom
 is an open register in that an American
 shipowner can register his vessels under the
 British flag. Among open registries, there are
 national registers which treat shipping compa
 nies in essentially the same manner as any
 other business in the country, and there are
 international registers which have been specifi
 cally set up to offer shipowners tax incentives
 in order to earn revenue from the registration
 of foreign ships. Then again, among interna
 tional registries, there are flags of convenience
 such as Cyprus where shipping regulations are
 lax and seldom enforced, and there are quasi
 FOCs such as Singapore, where the flag states
 exercise stricter control over their ships. Figure
 1 is a diagrammatic representation of the vari
 ous types of shipping registries.
 Flags of Convenience Shipping
 The term "flag of convenience" was first
 used in 1958 at a U.S. Senate Committee on
 Interstate and Foreign Commerce hearing. A
 representative of the United Fruit Company
 candidly admitted that his company registers
 its fleet under the Honduran flag because "...it
 is a flag of convenience."9 In its inquiry into
 shipping, the United Kingdom Committee
 under Lord Rochdale identified six features
 common to flag of convenience countries:10
 1) Allow ownership and/or control of their
 flag ships by non-citizens.
 2) Permit access to and unrestricted transfer
 of ship registration.
 3) Levy no or low local taxes on income.
 4) Are usually small countries that depend
 on registration and annual tonnage fees for a
 substantial portion of their national incomes.
 5) Permit manning of their flag ships by
 non-nationals.
 6) Have neither the power nor the adminis
 trative machinery to effectively impose any
 Figure 1. Types of Shipping Registries
 sT
 Closed
 (Russia)
 Registries
 Open
 National
 (United Kingdom)
 International
 Flags of Convenience
 (Cyprus)
 Quasi-FOC
 (Singapore)
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 government or international regulations or to
 control the shipping companies.
 The ten leading FOC registries today (with
 Liberia, Panama, and Cyprus leading the way)
 are ranked in Table 1.
 Table 1. Leading FOC Registries Ranked by
 Gross Tonnage (1991)
 Source: Compiled from Lloyd's Register of Shipping,
 Statistical Tables 1991, pp. 7-9.
 Note that FOC registries account for about
 30 percent of the world's gross shipping ton
 nage. The United States is the leading user fol
 lowed by Hong Kong, Greece, Japan, and
 Norway, together accounting for about three
 quarters of the total tonnage of the FOC fleet11
 consisting mainly of oil tankers and dry bulk
 and combination carriers.
 Advantages of FOC Shipping
 The rapid growth of FOC shipping from
 about 1 percent of the world's fleet tonnage in
 1940 to 10 percent in the mid '50s to 20 per
 cent in the early 1970s and 30 percent today
 can be attributed to the enormous advantages it
 offers to shipowners. First, FOC registries
 place fewer regulatory restrictions on the flag
 ships in such matters as vessel construction,
 repairs, manning, age, safety, and scheduling,
 and owners are free to add or lay up tonnage in
 response to market demand. Second, FOC
 countries typically do not levy taxes on corpo
 rate profits or crew income derived from the
 operation of their flag ships, but charge only
 nominal initial registration and annual tonnage
 fees ($1.08 and $.40 per net ton, respectively,
 in the case of Liberia, and $1.00 and $.10 per
 net ton, respectively, in the case of Panama).12
 Rank Country of Registry
 1. Liberia
 2. Panama
 3. Cyprus
 4. Malta
 5. Vanuatu
 6. Honduras
 7. Antigua and Barbuda
 8. Morocco
 9. Cayman Islands
 10. Sri Lanka
 Gross Tonnage
 (in millions)
 52.43
 44.95
 20.30
 6.92
 2.17
 .82
 .49
 .48
 .40
 .33
 FOC Total = 129.29
 World Total = 436.03
 Third, by registering their ships in FOC coun
 tries, shipowners can employ cheap foreign
 labor from Third World countries and avoid
 payments on fringe benefits and social security,
 and contributions to pension funds. On average,
 payroll costs on U.S. flag vessels are two to
 three times as high as those on FOC ships.13
 Therefore, for many American shipowners,
 "flags of convenience" are really "flags of
 necessity,"14 since manning cost is the most sig
 nificant cost variable, especially for those ships
 with largely written down capital values.15
 Fourth, there may be political advantages to
 foreign registry. For example, during the Suez
 Canal crisis and the Arab oil embargo, the reg
 istration of tankers in FOC countries allowed
 American oil companies to operate relatively
 unhindered. It is also believed that South
 African and Israeli interests have taken advan
 tage of the anonymity afforded by the FOC
 arrangement.
 The United States has always been the main
 beneficiary of the FOC system, not surprisingly
 since the American government promoted the
 Panamanian and Lib?ri?n registries.16 It was felt
 that because of very high wages, American bot
 toms could not compete internationally, and
 therefore needed to be reflagged in politically
 friendly countries with favorable tax structures
 and flexible labor laws. Furthermore, the major
 American oil companies own shipping sub
 sidiaries that operate oil tankers, and the major
 steel, coal, paper, and aluminum manufacturing
 companies operate their own dry bulk carriers.
 These industries, as well as importers and
 exporters of bulk commodities such as coal,
 have benefited from low-cost FOC shipping.
 The main advantage for FOC countries is
 that the registration and annual tonnage and
 miscellaneous fees generate rather sizable sums
 of revenue in hard currencies. For instance, rev
 enues from ship registries account for 3 percent
 of Liberia's gross national product and 3 per
 cent of the Panamanian government's
 revenues.17 Also, the FOC registries may create
 employment opportunities for nationals of the
 flag states. In fact, this was the main reason that
 Singapore opened up its registry in 1969.
 Safety, Pollution, and Manpower Problems
 The advantages that led to the reflagging of
 aging vessels under FOC registries also led to
 three major problems: safety concerns, pollu
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 tion, and the exploitation of cheap non-union
 ized labor. Flags of convenience countries are
 notorious for not having or not strictly enforc
 ing manning, maintenance, and safety stan
 dards. Even if they made an honest attempt to
 enforce these regulations, many of these so
 called pirate ships never or seldom call upon
 the port of registry, a problem compounded by
 the fact that many ships are registered using
 bearer shares where ownership cannot be
 traced. This problem of a lack of accountability
 was vividly demonstrated by Liberia's inabili
 ty, even after twenty weeks, to contact the
 owner of the AMOCO Cadiz, a tanker that was
 grounded in March 1973.18 And even if the
 owners can be identified and traced in the case
 of accidents, liability can and is often limited to
 one-ship brass plate companies, a common
 practice in FOC registrations.
 The problem of safety was most acute in the
 case of Cyprus and Lebanon. An OECD study
 showed that these two FOC countries had loss
 rates (percent of total fleet) about thirteen times
 higher than the world average.19 Panama even
 considered closing its registry in 1975, which is
 exactly what Costa Rica did after discovering
 that some of her ships were actually engaged in
 illegal activities.20 Tired of dealing with unsafe
 rust buckets, Honduras tightened up its regula
 tions to the point where its FOC registry has
 diminished to less than one million gross tons.
 The international community reacted to man
 ning and safety concerns by passing several
 conventions, in particular the International
 Labor Organization (ILO) Umbrella Con
 vention No. 147, called the Merchant Shipping
 (Minimum Standards) Convention and cover
 ing safety and training standards, conditions of
 employment, and shipboard living arrange
 ments. Maritime safety is also promoted by the
 Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention,
 entering into force in 1980, and the 1977
 International Regulations for the Prevention of
 Collisions at Sea. Marine pollution is governed
 by the 1973 International Convention on the
 Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships
 (MARPOL), amended in 1978. To circumvent
 these conventions, some FOC vessels have
 been known to employ phantom officers who
 are temporarily placed aboard ships to obtain
 inspection clearance and then removed, and to
 use hired safety equipment placed on a vessel
 undergoing a survey and then transferred to the
 ext vessel coming up for inspection.21
 Opposition to the FOC System
 Often manned by undertrained and underpaid
 crews, FOC ships have come under opposition
 mainly from seamen's unions, in particular the
 International Transport Workers' Federation
 (ITF). The ITF has recommended a wage scale
 for seamen based on Northern European stan
 dards and issues blue cards to masters of ships
 employing crews under specified conditions.
 Ships not carrying blue cards may be black
 balled by inspectors in affiliated port states. It
 also wants ships to be operated under the flag
 of the country of beneficial ownership and
 manned by their nationals.
 In the 1970s, the less-developed countries
 (LDCs) called the "Group of 77," voiced their
 opposition to flags of convenience. They suc
 cessfully engineered the passage of the 1974
 UNCTAD Liner Code of Conduct (fully rati
 fied in 1983), which embodied the 40/40/20
 principle, calling for importers and exporters to
 each carry 40 percent of the cargo on ships reg
 istered under their flags, with the remaining 20
 percent to be left to cross-traders.22 However,
 despite generating close to 40 percent of all
 international seaborne cargo, the LDCs own
 only about 16 percent of the world fleet ton
 nage.23 Most of them feel that if the FOC sys
 tem is abolished, many shipowners from the
 traditional maritime nations will reflag their
 ships in LDC registries because of a ready sup
 ply of labor at wages below the ITF-mandated
 levels. They expect that up to one-third of the
 FOC fleet would do so.24 However, the UNC
 TAD Liner Code of Conduct is almost a dead
 letter and has been virtually ignored.25
 The FOC fleet has also been increasing at the
 expense of those belonging to the developed
 traditional maritime countries such as Greece,
 the United Kingdom, Norway, and the
 Netherlands, all of which have suffered loss of
 tax revenues from the foreign registry of their
 ships and loss of employment for their seafar
 ing nationals. Thus, in 1981, they joined the
 less-developed countries to get the Shipping
 Committee of UNCTAD to adopt a resolution
 recommending that "the present regime of open
 registries be gradually and progressively trans
 ferred into normal registries."26
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 The Genuine Link Concept
 The legal attacks on flags of convenience
 have always hinged on the genuine link con
 cept. A case involving Guatemala and
 Liechtenstein argued before the International
 Court of Justice provided what became the ulti
 mate basis for a legal challenge to the uncondi
 tional law of the flag. Kurt Nottenbohm, a
 German citizen resident in Guatemala, rapidly
 changed his citizenship to Liechtenstein at the
 outbreak of World War II. When Guatemala
 seized his property as that of an enemy
 German, Liechtenstein protested. The Court
 finally ruled in 1955 in favor of Guatemala, cit
 ing the lack of a "genuine link" between
 Nottenbohm and Liechtenstein in that he had
 only lived there briefly, had no business there,
 and his naturalization was secured solely for
 the purpose of evading the confiscation of his
 property.27
 The opponents of flags of convenience
 quickly sought to extend the genuine link prin
 ciple to shipping and got the Law of the Sea
 Conference (1958) to adopt a resolution,
 embodied in Article 5, holding that, "There
 must be a genuine link between the State and
 the ship; in particular, the State must effective
 ly exercise its jurisdiction and control in admin
 istration, technical, and social matters over the
 ships that fly its flag."28 Two things are note
 worthy. First, the provision did not address the
 economic aspects of what constitutes a genuine
 link, namely the nationality of the beneficial
 owner and the flag of registry. Second, the
 Americans had successfully argued against
 defining what a genuine link means; instead the
 focus was on enforcement.
 However, in 1986, the opponents of flags of
 convenience got UNCTAD to pass the United
 Nations Convention on Conditions for
 Registration of Ships. As expressed in Article
 1, the Convention sought to "strengthen the
 genuine link between a State ship and its flag in
 order to give more effective control ... in
 administration, technical, economic (emphasis
 added), and social matters." It also finally
 defined in Articles 8, 9, and 10 the three essen
 tial elements of a genuine link.29 First, it provid
 ed that the shipowning company should estab
 lish its principal place of business in the flag
 country, otherwise the company must have a
 representative who is a citizen of the flag coun
 try or is domiciled there to be available for
 legal proceedings. Second, nationals of the flag
 state should participate in the ownership of
 ships registered there, to an extent that the flag
 state can effectively exercise its jurisdiction
 and control. Third, a reasonable number of
 crew members should be nationals of or domi
 ciled in the country of registry, with the level of
 participation dependent on the availability of
 qualified seafarers and consistent with the
 sound and economical operation of the ship.
 Note that the provision on vessel manage
 ment (domicile of the company or its represen
 tative) is mandatory while those on ownership
 and manning are optional in that the country of
 registry can adopt either one or both, a conces
 sion to the less-developed countries which may
 have a lack of capital for participation in own
 ership or qualified seafarers for crews. Other
 provisions require the establishment of compe
 tent maritime administrations to enforce nation
 al and international maritime laws, and insist
 that owners and operators of ships be clearly
 identifiable and held accountable.
 Quasi-FOC Registries
 As a result of the longstanding opposition to
 flags of convenience, legal challenges, and the
 United Nations resolutions calling for the even
 tual abolishment of FOC shipping, many reg
 istries have opted to set themselves up as quasi
 FOCs with genuine links to their flag ships.
 Metaxas defines quasi-flags of convenience as
 those countries or areas that offer some or even
 all of the advantages of FOC (arrangements) to
 attract tonnage to their registry, but which dif
 fer from FOCs because they (a) have or can
 develop the administrative machinery to effec
 tively impose any government or international
 regulations, and (b) do have a substantial
 requirement for some of the shipping registered
 under their flags.30 Typically, quasi-FOCs do
 not impose taxes on corporate profits or sea
 men's incomes, and assess only nominal regis
 tration and tonnage taxes. But they do adminis
 ter and enforce strict regulations pertaining to
 ship management, manning, and safety, and
 insist that all owners be clearly identifiable and
 be held accountable for liabilities.
 Given the above definition, the following
 registries can be considered to be quasi-FOCs:
 Bermuda, the Bahamas, Gibraltar, Hong Kong,
 the Netherlands Antilles, Norwegian
 International Shipping Registry, the Isles of
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 Man, and Singapore. Their ranked importance
 Table 2. Quasi-FOCs Ranked by Gross
 Tonnage (1991)
 Gross Tonnage
 Rank Country of Registry (in millions)
 1. Norwegian International Shipping 18.51
 2. Bahamas 17.54
 3. Singapore 8.49
 4. Hong Kong 5.88
 5. Bermuda 3.04
 6. Gibraltar 1.41
 7. Isles of Man .98
 8. Netherlands Antilles .53
 Quasi-FOC Total = 56.38
 World Total = 436.03
 Source: Compiled from Lloyd's Register of Shipping,
 Statistical Tables 1991, pp. 7-9.
 is shown in Table 2. Note that quasi-FOCs
 account for 13 percent of the world's gross
 shipping tonnnage. Also, there appear to be
 three broad categories: colonial outposts, cap
 tive registries, and sovereign state.
 Colonial Outposts
 All ships registered in the Netherlands
 Antilles fly the Dutch flag, while those regis
 tered in Bermuda, the Bahamas, and Gibraltar
 fly the British flag and are subject to British
 regulations on manning, safety, and certifica
 tion (all strictly enforced). For the Bahamas, all
 ships under 1,600 tons or more than twelve
 years old need special permission to register,
 while for Bermuda, many of the officers must
 be British or Commonwealth certificated. Ships
 under the Gibraltar registry must carry a British
 master. The United States has been encourag
 ing the registration of American-owned vessels
 in the Bahamas, thus ensuring that the vessels
 are not only competitive but are safely operated
 as well, because of the tight regulations. The
 United States has also concluded agreements
 with the Bahamas to ensure recognition of the
 Effective United States Control (EUSC) doc
 trine, which allows the requisition of
 American-owned vessels in case of war or
 emergencies.31 Thus, the Bahamas has experi
 enced tremendous growth in shipping tonnage,
 from .10 million gross tons in 1960 to 17.54
 million gross tons in 1991, as a quasi-FOC sec
 ond only to the Norwegian International
 Shipping Registry (18.51 million gross tons).32
 Captive Registries
 The exodus of ships from the traditional
 maritime nations has been especially hard on
 Norway, which lost more than three quarters of
 its shipping tonnage over a particularly critical
 ten-year period from 1977 (27.80 million gross
 tons) to 1987 (6.36 million gross tons).33 This
 prompted her to set up the Norwegian
 International Shipping (NIS) registry in Bergen
 to retain the Norwegian fleet and attract others.
 The NIS registry allows for direct registration
 of ships incorporated elsewhere (it is sufficient
 for the foreign company to have a representa
 tive in Norway), thus exempting shipowners
 from Norwegian incorporation and corporate
 taxes. However, NIS-flagged ships must be
 commercially and technically managed by
 Norwegian companies. There are no require
 ments on the nationality of the officers and
 crew, who are not obliged to pay Norwegian
 income tax. The NIS registry is subject to
 Norway's existing obligations to international
 maritime conventions.34
 The United Kingdom has set up, on a smaller
 scale, a captive registry on the Isles of Man
 (IOM), located 30 miles offshore. The IOM
 registry requires that shipowning companies be
 incorporated on the island, but there is no tax
 on offshore income, subject to certain qualifica
 tions and an annual fee of $430. Because of its
 offshore status, shipowners can contract with
 non-B itish companies incorporated in British
 dependencies for the supply of seamen, thus
 circumventing restrictive British employment
 laws.35
 The success of these two registries has
 prompted proposals to set up captive registries
 in France, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg,
 and Hong Kong. The proposed new shipping
 registry in Hong Kong would be open to for
 ign shipowners who would be required to
 form a tangible link with its future status to be
 known as the Hong Kong Special Adminis
 rative Region under China's rule beginning in
 1997. Shipowners must either be resident in
 Hong Kong or place their ships under the man
 agement of local companies, but there will be
no restrictions on crew nationality. Also, there
 will not b  any corporate income tax except on
 prof ts arising from outbound freight. Though
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 the proposed registry has received the tacit
 approval of the People's Republic of China, it
 is unlikely to be very successful, given the
 political uncertainties of association with a
 communist captive registry.36
 Sovereign State: The Case of Singapore
 Among the eight quasi-FOCs that have been
 collectively identified, Singapore is the only
 one that is truly independent.37 Singapore is an
 island city state about 200 square miles in area
 with a population of almost three million peo
 ple governed by a western-style democracy.
 Strategically located in Southeast Asia, she
 stands at the crossroads of world commerce ?
 almost all shipping from Europe to the Far East
 and Australia and the other way around calls
 on Singapore, making her the world's busiest
 port in terms of visiting shipping tonnage.38
 Founded in 1819 as an English free port, the
 Merchant Shipping (Amendment) Act of 1966
 created the Singapore Shipping Registry to
 reflect Singapore's newly independent status.
 Only vessels owned by Singapore citizens or
 companies could fly her flag.
 Three years later in 1969, to create employ
 ment opportunities, Singapore opened up its
 registry to ships (over fifteen tons) owned by
 any national or company, thus establishing
 Singapore as a flag of convenience. The regis
 tration fee was set at a nominal $1.50 per net
 ton with the annual tonnage tax at $.12 per net
 ton. Although there were no restrictions on
 crew nationality, vessels with crew comprising
 at least 25 percent Singaporeans would enjoy a
 50 percent rebate of the annual tonnage tax.
 Corporate profits and crew wages (but not
 management fees) from the operation of ships
 outside Singapore would be exempt from
 income tax. As a result of the financial incen
 tives and flexibility in the management of ships
 and crewing, Singapore's shipping tonnage
 grew from a mere .23 million gross tons in
 1969 to 7.66 million gross tons in 1980. But as
 a flag of convenience, Singapore did not excer
 cise effective control over her flag ships and
 was identified as one of three FOCs (together
 with Cyprus and Somalia) with the worst mar
 itime accident rates.39
 Tired of the stigma of being a flag of conve
 nience, Singapore passed the Merchant
 Shipping Regulations in 1981, converting her
 shipping registry to a quasi-FOC. To establish
 a genuine link, registration was limited to ships
 wholly or partly owned by Singaporeans or by
 companies incorporated in Singapore, with full
 disclosure of the owners.40 To upgrade and
 modernize the fleet, foreign-owned ships must
 be at least 1,600 gross registered tons, and all
 newly registered vessels must be less than fif
 teen years old and must produce evidence of
 seaworthiness annually. This caused a signifi
 cant lowering of the average age of the fleet as
 well as a drop in the accidental loss ratio to .10
 percent, far less than the world average of .28
 percent.41 In keeping with her new status as a
 quasi-FOC, Singapore dutifully ratified the
 SOLAS Convention promoting safety at sea,
 the MARPOL Convention relating to the pre
 vention of ocean pollution, and the
 International Regulations for the Prevention of
 Collisions at Sea. Singapore has implemented
 so many tight regulations that the Department
 of Marine has received "complaints" that
 Singapore has unwittingly become a "flag of
 inconvenience"!
 To attract larger ships and bigger fleets, the
 registration fee was capped at a maximum of
 $60,000 in 1988, and as of 1989, an owner
 transferring at least three ships totalling 40,000
 net tons is entitled to an 80 percent discount. In
 1991, Singapore introduced an innovative
 package called the Approved International
 Shipping (AIS) Enterprise Scheme, under
 which, in addition to the existing exemption
 from corporate and personal income taxes, all
 Singapore incorporated shipping companies
 awarded AIS status for ten years (renewable)
 enjoy tax exemptions for ships registered else
 where. To qualify, the shipping company must
 be a significant owner and operator of a fleet of
 ships,42 have a directly attributable business
 expenditure of at least $2.4 million a year in
 Singapore, and have at least 10 percent of its
 fleet registered under the Singapore flag.
 All these financial incentives, plus
 Singapore's reputation as a politically stable
 and well governed country with excellent com
 munication facilities and a worldwide network
 of consular services, contributed to her phe
 nomenal growth as a shipping registry.
 Shipping tonnage has grown from .02 million
 gross tons in 1966 when the registry was first
 established to 8.49 million gross tons in 1991,
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 making it the eleventh largest shipping registry
 in the world,43 larger than that of the United
 Kingdom including the Isles of Man.44
 Singapore's shipping tonnage grew at an aver
 age 8.3 percent annually in the last two years
 reported, about three times the 2.9 percent
 annual increase in the world fleet.45
 Conclusion
 We have seen that much of the opposition to
 FOC shipping is because of poor safety and
 manning practices, something that agencies of
 the United Nations have tried to address for
 many decades. The problem of substandard
 FOC shipping appears to be diminishing for
 two main reasons. First, the major FOC coun
 tries such as Liberia and even Panama have
 tightened up their regulations and increased
 enforcement on matters of ship safety and man
 ning. For example, Liberia has been making
 sure that her flagships conform to IMO
 Standards for Certification, Training, and
 Watchkeeping, and has instituted annual safety
 inspections of her flag ships. Therefore,
 Liberia's safety record has for some time been
 on par with, or superior to, the world average.46
 Second, under the rules of "port state control,"
 individual governments have been inspecting
 foreign vessels calling at their ports.
 However, it is clear that substandard ship
 ping is caused by inadequate regulations, impo
 tent maritime administrations, and unidentifi
 able owners. Directing action against substan
 dard vessels is tackling the result rather than
 the cause of the problem. The private needs of
 shipowners to operate their ships economically
 and competitively and the public need for safe
 ty and decent manning practices in shipping
 can best be met by the newly emerging quasi
 FOC arrangement.
 This type of ship registry will grow rapidly
 for three major reasons. First, many shipown
 ers from the traditional maritime nations have
 been attracted to their own captive registries,
 while others have reflagged their vessels in
 other quasi-FOCs such as Singapore. Second,
 more and more of the traditional maritime
 countries will set up their own captive reg
 istries similar to the NIS and IOM registries.
 This is already being contemplated by France,
 Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, and Hong
 Kong. Third, tired of harboring rust buckets,
 pira e ships, free booters, and runaway ships,
 many FOC registries will convert themselves
 to quasi-FOC registries, just as Singapore has
 done.
 It is also predicted that by the end of the cen
 tury, as the only quasi-FOC that is truly opera
 tionally independent and with an international
 reputation for efficiency,47 Singapore will not
 only be one of the most important shipping
 registries, but will also be one of the most
 important maritime centers in the world for
 shipbuilding and repairing, cargo handling, the
 supply of seafarers, victuals, and bunkers, and
 the provision of marine insurance, surveying,
 arbitration, and financial and management ser
 vices, congruent with her status as the world's
 busiest port. As a sovereign state that has
 signed all the major international maritime
 conventions48 on safety, manning, and pollution
 control, and as a registry that effectively
 enforces strict regulations on its flag ships with
 clearly identifiable owners, Singapore, in try
 ing to establish a genuine link between flag and
 ship, has set herself up as one of the most
 exemplary quasi-FOCs ? which we believe
 will be the wave of the future.
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